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I am very honoured to be here, and would like first of all to thank
President Alcantara for his kind invitation to speak to you about the
WTO dispute settlement system. I do not want to focus on Brazil’s
experience of WTO disputes, but it is nonetheless appropriate to
begin by noting that Brazil is one of the most active participants in
the system. Including cases that have been settled, Brazil has been
a complainant in 21 cases, and a defendant 12 times.1 Of the
cases brought by Brazil, 10 were against the US, 7 against the EU,
and, in this region, 1 against Mexico, 1 against Peru and 2 against
Argentina. Of the 12 cases brought against Brazil, 3 were brought
by the US, 4 by the EU, and, in this region, just one, by Argentina. I
did not come here, though, to list statistics. Rather, I would like to
outline to you some of the more interesting features of the WTO
dispute settlement system, and also describe some of its
outstanding problems. And here again it is appropriate that I am
here addressing Brazilian lawyers, because Brazil has been
responsible for some of the most recent interesting developments
in WTO dispute settlement.
 
Outline of WTO rules
The basic WTO agreements (GATT, GATS, TRIPS, and others)
are designed to prevent WTO Members from restricting trade in
goods and services, and to ensure a high standard of intellectual
property protection. Under the GATT and GATS, import restrictions
on goods and services are negotiated, and in addition there are
basic principles are non-discrimination between domestic and
foreign products and services, and among foreign products and
services. The rules on intellectual property are somewhat different:
under TRIPS, intellectual property rights must be granted domestic
protection for WTO Member rights holders. There are numerous
exceptions to these obligations, especially in the area of services,
and WTO Members are permitted to adopt measures for public
policy or national security reasons.
 
The WTO dispute settlement system
These rules are of course important, but what is particularly
significant is that they are enforced by one of the world’s most
effective international dispute mechanisms. The jurisdiction of
WTO panels and the Appellate Body is both exclusive (every
complaining WTO Member must use the system) and compulsory
(every defendant must turn up on the day in court). It is relatively
fast, by the standards of large litigation. A panel is supposed to
complete its work by 9 months, with a further 3 for an Appellate
Body hearing. In reality, these stages are extended somewhat, and
there are further stages to verify compliance, these stages having
their own appeals, but even so an average case is completed in
around 3-4 years. What is more, the WTO dispute settlement
system is backed up by a system of remedies that, at least in many
cases, is sufficiently threatening to induce recalcitrant defendants
to comply with their WTO obligations.
 
From GATT diplomacy to WTO law
Before the WTO was established in 1995, there was both a set of
trade rules — the GATT, which dealt with trade in goods — and a
dispute settlement system involving GATT panels. These panels
were also active: between 1952 and 1995 there were 123 panels.
This compares to 147 WTO panel reports in the last 15 years.
Taken together, this is around twice the total number of cases
decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice and the
International Court of Justice since 1922.
But while the old GATT system had many virtues and was
responsible for solving many trade disputes, from a purely legal
perspective it had some basic flaws. In the first place, the system
was entirely voluntary. A defendant was able to prevent a panel
being established; even if it agreed to this, it could prevent the
resulting panel report from being adopted (which meant it had no
legal value); and even if it agreed to this, it could prevent the
winning party from enforcing the report by means of trade
sanctions.
This was not the only problem with the system. Another problem
was that the legal analysis of panel reports was often relatively
weak by normal standards. Partly, but not wholly, this was due to the
fact that the panellists were trade officials without any legal training.
For much of the GATT’s existence, this was perfectly fine. The
panel process was seen as trade negotiations by other means. In
fact, there was a strong aversion to legalism, and evento lawyers.
There were no official legal officers at all for the first thirty years of
the GATT’s, existence. It was only when the US and the EC began
to attack each other, and others, with the full force of professional
legal argument, that this became untenable. After a series of panel
rulings that were widely seen as wrong, it seemed like a good idea
to build up the legal expertise of the GATT system. But even this
was done gradually. The first GATT legal officer ever was
appointed in 1980, and the experimental nature of this appointment
was secured by limiting the post to a two year term, and by giving
the post to a senior GATT official who was due to retire in two
years. But in fact, the experiment was successful, and led 15 years
later to a complete shift in the character of dispute settlement.
The WTO dispute settlement system is in some ways similar to the
GATT system — there are still panels, and the panellists are still
overwhelmingly trade officials, although these days often with some
legal training. There are also some atavistic elements in the system
(on which I will say more in a moment). But the differences from the
old system are more striking than the similarities. As I mentioned,
jurisdiction is now exclusive and compulsory. The quality of panel
reports has improved markedly — although so, unfortunately, has
their length: in some cases they run to more than 1000 pages. And
there is a new Appellate Body, a permanent judicial body whose
seven members are senior figures from academia, government or
judiciaries, and who are required to be expert in trade law (and very
often are, at least after a short while). The WTO Appellate Body
hears appeals on questions of law, while panels operate at first
instance, and have an exclusive mandate to make factual findings.
In the last 15 years, the Appellate Body has established itself as a
significant player on the international judicial stage, and its rulings
are of high quality, in many cases at least comparable and
sometimes better reasoned than those of the International Court of
Justice, or the European Court of Justice. This is not to say that the
WTO judicial system is universally loved. There have been
accusations of judicial activism, especially from the United States.
But its position now appears to be secure.
 Compliance and remedies for non-compliance
Against this introductory background, let me now turn to how the
WTO dispute settlement system works. This can be seen best in
terms of the compliance of losing defendants, and what happens
when there is no compliance.
Article 21.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) states
that:
 
Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the
DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of
disputes to the benefit of all Members.
 
As a rule, a losing defendant has 15 months to comply (Article
21.4), but this is subject to arbitration, and may be shorter or longer,
depending on the measure at issue. If the measure can be
reversed by a simple administrative act, 15 months is too long. If it
takes new legislation, or even a constitutional amendment, 15
months might be too short. In practice, most defendants found to
have violated WTO law comply: probably around 85% (the statistics
are hard to assess, in part because of cases of part-compliance or
even pretend-compliance).
But what if a WTO Member does not comply? This is where the
system of remedies comes in. These are set out in Article 22 of the
DSU, and come in two flavours: compensation, and the suspension
of concessions. Let me deal with these in turn. Compensation is
not described at all in the DSU, except that it must be by ‘mutually
satisfactory’ agreement between the winner and the loser, and that
it must be consistent with the WTO agreements. This last
requirement could mean a lot of things, but what that it certainly
means is that, to the extent that it involves trade, any compensation
granted to a winning party must also be extended to all other WTO
Members on a non-discriminatory basis.
And until very recently, compensation was thought always to involve
trade. That is to say, a defendant that did not want to comply with a
ruling would offer a winning party market access (usually in the form
of lower duties) in another sector. But there were precious few
examples of this ever happening, in part because of the condition
that I mentioned before, that compensation has to be on a non-
discriminatory basis. This means that unless there was a product
that only the complainant exported to the defendant this was not a
very attractive remedy for either side: for the defendant because it
would be opening up market access for all exporters, and for the
complainant because it would gain market access, but in
competition with other exporters. Put it this way: if Brazil won a case
against the EU, would it want compensation in the form of lower
duties for coffee if this meant also benefiting Colombian coffee
exporters?
Because compensation was not described in the DSU, it was
always possible that this might include financial compensation. But
this possibility was always treated as extremely unlikely in normal
trade cases, though one case involving violations of intellectual
property protections under the TRIPS agreement was settled in this
way. Compensation was always understood to mean enhanced
market access in another sector. But then came the dispute in US –
Upland Cotton, in which Brazil successfully challenged United
States subsidies on cotton. The United States refused to comply,
but in April this year the United States agreed to compensate Brazil
by means of a financial settlement amounting to $147.3m a year, to
go to a ‘Fund for Technical Assistance and Capacity Building’ to
benefit Brazilian cotton farmers — as well as cotton farmers in other
developing countries. What this means, somewhat strangely, is that
now the US taxpayers are paying both for the US cotton industry as
well as its competitors. This is certainly a strange result. In fact, it
gets stranger. Another aspect of the settlement was the
redesignation of the Brazilian province of Santa Catarina as a
region free of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), rinderpest, swine
vesicular disease (SVD), classical swine fever (CSF) and African
swine fever (ASF), notified on Monday and effective on 1
December 2010. Now, in the WTO this sort of decision is
supposed to be made on the basis of science, not as part of a
settlement of a dispute. We are yet to see what other WTO
Members will make of this.
So why did the US fight all the way to the end, only to agree to pay
this large amount of financial compensation? This was not out of
the goodness of its heart, but rather because it was faced with
retaliation of an annual value of more than $800m, much more than
the $147.3m it now has to pay in cash. Let me explain a little how
this came about.
Under Article 22.2 of the DSU, when faced with non-compliance by
a losing WTO Member, the successful complainant may ask the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for authorization to suspend
WTO obligations (ie ‘retaliation’). The Dispute Settlement Body is
technically a political body comprised of Ambassador-level
diplomats, which administers certain aspects of the WTO dispute
settlement system. In this case, however, the DSB has no choice:
under Article 22.6 it must grant the request unless, by consensus, it
rejects the request. This would of course mean that the winning
party would at the same time have to make a request for
countermeasures and vote to reject this request: a patent absurdity.
Why this possibility even exists can only be explained by reference
to the old GATT system of consensus used for all decisions,
including this type of decision: under the WTO, the idea of
consensus was kept, but now decisions are taken automatically
unless blocked by consensus.
 Retaliation: is it effective?
Now I would like to say more about the system of retaliation in the
WTO, and I want to do this by addressing this question: is the
system effective in inducing the violating party to comply with its
obligations? Recall, if you will, the statement in Article 21.1 of the
DSU that:
 
Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the
DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of
disputes to the benefit of all Members.
 
Is this just wishful thinking? I propose to address this question by
comparing enforcement of WTO dispute settlement system with
the enforcement of general international law, as set out in the
Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law
Commission in 2001, and noted and recommended to
Governments by the Sixth Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly. Article 30 of these Articles (Cessation and non-
repetition) states as follows:
 
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is
under an obligation:(a) to cease that act, if it is continuing;(b) to
offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition,
if circumstances so require.
 
This is similar to the DSU’s requirement of compliance. One point
that is not mentioned however in this provision is the timing of
cessation. One might think that it should be immediate, and that is
sometimes possible, but of course this depends upon the nature of
the violation. Some measures might take longer to cease: think, for
example, of an illegal occupation of a country. In the case of the
WTO, the measures usually at issue range from administrative
practices all the way through to rules contained in constitutions or
international treaties. Respecting this typology and variety of
measures that need to be undone, Article 21.3 of the DSU gives a
defendant WTO Member a ‘reasonable period of time’ to bring its
measure into compliance with WTO law. The default is 15 months,
but it can be shorter or longer. In other words, the DSU is precise
where the Articles on State Responsibility are not. But one would
no doubt arrive at the same result under those rules.
But there is more to it than this. Article 31 (Reparation) of the
Articles on State Responsibility goes on to say that:
 
The responsible State is under an obligation to make full
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act.
 
Under Article 34 to 36, reparation is to be effected by restitution,
failing which by compensation. This set of obligations is entirely
missing in the WTO system. It is established practice that past
injury (dated from the end of the ‘reasonable period of compliance’)
must be borne by the injured party without compensation of any
type.
Instead, the WTO dispute settlement system goes straight to
authorized countermeasures. These are designed to induce a
recalcitrant violator to comply with its obligations. In many ways
these are similar to the countermeasures described the Articles on
State Responsibility. I would like to illustrate the system of WTO
countermeasures by reference to these provisions.
A first similarity concerns the purpose of countermeasures. Article
49(1) of the Articles on State Responsibility states that:
 
An injured State may only take countermeasures against a
State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in
order to induce that State to comply with its obligations
under part two.
 
Likewise, WTO arbitrators, including the arbitrators in US – Upland
Cotton, have specifically said that authorized retaliation in the WTO
is intended to induce compliance.
There are also other similarities as well. One is that under both
regimes countermeasures are supposed to be temporary. Article
49(3) of the Articles on State Responsibility states that
countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time
being of international obligations of the State taking the measures
towards the responsible State. Likewise, Article 22.8 of the DSU
states that:
 
The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be
temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the
measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement
has been removed.
 
A second is that they must be proportionate to the injury caused.
This is stated in Article 51 of the Articles on State Responsibility;
for its part, Article 22.8 of the DSU states that ‘[t]he level of the
suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the
DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or
impairment.’
Now, one might ask whether this is actually consistent with the
purpose of countermeasures, or DSU retaliation, which is to induce
compliance. The basic problem is that some proportionate
countermeasures will be too weak to induce compliance. In fact,
under the Article on State Responsibility, if there is a choice
between proportionate and effective countermeasures, this choice
is resolved in favour of the proportionate countermeasures. (One
might ask whether a measure that can have no prospect of inducing
a recalcitrant country to comply with its obligations even qualifies as
a measure to induce compliance under Article 49(1) of the Articles
on State Responsibility, but it is probably better simply to say that
the Articles apply a very light standard of review to the question of
effectiveness.)
Now, what about under the DSU? In fact, we see the same
problem, but there is an added twist, which is that Article 22.3
contains language about the ‘effectiveness’ of retaliatory measures.
This appears in a special context, which I should explain. The
default rule, set out in this provision, is that the obligations
suspended have to be in the same agreement as the one that was
violated. In other words, there is a system of reciprocity: if a WTO
Member illegally blocks imports of your goods, you can block
imports of its goods; if it is services, then also services, and if there
is a failure to protect your nationals’ intellectual property rights, you
get to block these. But there is an exception: in some cases, the
winning party is able also to suspend obligations in other WTO
agreements. This is called ‘cross-retaliation’, and what it means in
practice is that intellectual property rights, or services, can be
suspended in retaliation for illegally blocked exports of goods.
Cross-retaliation is permitted when two conditions are satisfied: that
normal retaliation is not ‘practicable’ or ‘effective’. Not being
‘practicable’ means that relevant obligations do not exist, and so
cannot be suspended; but not being ‘effective’ is more
complicated.
The question of ‘effectiveness’, in the sense of inducing
compliance, has come up on a number of occasions involving small
developing countries and economic superpowers, where the
developing country complainants seek permission to cross-
retaliate. After it won the Gambling case against the US, Antigua
stated that ‘ceasing all trade whatsoever with the United States
(approximately US$180 million annually, or less than 0.02 per cent
of all exports from the United States) would have virtually no impact
on the economy of the United States, which could easily shift such
a relatively small volume of trade elsewhere.’ Ecuador was in the
same position, after it won the Bananas case against the EU.
Ecuador imported less than 0.1 per cent of total EU, leading the
Arbitrator in that case to query whether the objective of inducing
compliance ‘may ever be achieved where a great imbalance in
terms of trade volume and economic power exists between the
complaining party seeking suspension and the other party.’
The situation seemed, superficially, similar in US – Upland Cotton.
Brazil argued that it should be permitted to suspend obligations in
services and intellectual property because simply imposing
restrictions on imports of US goods would be ‘ineffective’. There
were various reasons for this. One, which is most relevant here,
was the relatively low importance of the Brazilian market for the
United States. Brazil claimed that:
 
[t]he significantly unbalanced nature of the trade relations
between Brazil and the United States, and the considerable
economic differences between the two countries, render the
suspension of concessions and other obligations under trade
in goods alone neither practicable nor effective as a response
to the United States’ failure to comply with its obligations. (para
5.124)
 
Furthermore,
 
Brazil also considers that countermeasures restricted solely to
trade in goods may not have sufficient political influence to
press for the United States’ withdrawal of the billions in US
dollars annually paid subsidies or to remove their adverse
effects. Therefore, such countermeasures are not “effective”
for the purpose of encouraging compliance. (para 5.126)
 
But this time Arbitrator rejected this as irrelevant. It said:
 
Brazil’s insistence that its countermeasures must have
“sufficient political influence” from the perspective of the
United States to press for the withdrawal of the subsidies and
the removal of their adverse effects is misplaced.
“Effectiveness” relates to the ability of a Member to have
recourse to the authorized remedy, such that it can serve to
induce compliance. However, the preference of a Member for
a particular type of countermeasure, because it would
constitute a more powerful form of persuasion in a political
sense, is not a relevant consideration for an arbitrator in these
proceedings. (para 5.198)
 
This represents a shift from the general theme in the Antigua and
Ecuador arbitrations. It is perhaps a shame for the position of
developing countries in the dispute settlement system. One the
other hand, this position does have the virtue of being consistent
with general international law on the law of countermeasures. But
whether that means that it is a good result is a different story
altogether. Perhaps the problem is with the general rule.
There was however another aspect of the ‘effectiveness’ of the
suspension of the GATT which was more favourable to Brazil, and
which bears on developing countries more generally. This was the
argument that suspending obligations on imports of goods would
harm Brazil. The reason for this was that, according to Brazil, 95%
of these products are capital goods, intermediate goods, or other
inputs essential to the Brazilian economy. It said that:
 
[t]he costs involved in switching suppliers arenormally
prohibitive for capital goods and intermediate goods. In
addition to prices, decisions on thepurchase of capital or
intermediate goods are conditioned by several factors that
severely constrain theability of producers to switch suppliers.
These factors include: (i) long-term contracts cannot
beterminated easily or without heavy pecuniary penalties; (ii)
capital goods in particular are tailor-made… and are ordered
many months or even years inadvance; (iii) in most industries,
inputs must have the exact technical specifications that match
therequirements of the machinery in place …; (iv) intellectual
property protection and intra-company trade
determinepurchase decisions and curb the ability of producers
to change suppliers. (para 5.126)
 
The arbitrator dealt with this by saying that:
 there may be situations in which, for example, the complaining
party is heavily dependent on imports from the other party, to
such an extent that it may cause more harm to itself than it
would to the other party, if it were to suspend concessions or
other obligations in relation to these imports. In such a
situation, where the complaining party would cause itself
disproportionate harm, such that it would in fact be unable to
use the authorization, there would be a basis for concluding
that such suspension would not be “effective”. (para 5.79)
 
To the extent that the arbitrator recognized that the harm to a party
proposing to impose sanctions, this is a welcome ruling. On the
other hand, it is not clear why the arbitratorshould all of a sudden be
interested in the actual effect of the sanctions on the target country,
which is a consideration otherwise rejected. Nor, building on this, is
it clear what the significance is of the relative harm caused to the
target and the author of the retaliation. Surely the only significant
question is the harm caused to the author of the retaliation. One
could, for example, imagine that two countries of similar size and
development are equally harmed by proposed retaliation. Why
should it be ‘effective’ for the one party to impose retaliation in this
case, but not in the case of a target country which is less harmed?
But at least there is some hope here for the situation of developing
countries.
Now, this is all an argument in favour of cross-retaliation. But it is
important to recognize that cross-retaliation is not a cure for the
basic problem, because developing countries also depend on
services — at least of some types — and intellectual property. No
country wants to expel foreign banks and telecommunications
companies in retaliation for a block on goods. These measures are
therefore not effective, in the sense that the winning party will be
unwilling to take them.
What about intellectual property? At least superficially, this appears
to be less of a problem, because the suspension of obligations
under TRIPS simply means that royalties do not need to be paid for
the use of foreign owned intellectual property. In other words, all of
the factors that make compliance with TRIPS unpopular for
developing countries make the suspension of TRIPS obligations as
a form of cross-retaliation attractive to them. But here, too, there are
practical problems. Not paying royalties sends a bad message to
foreign investors.
Another difficulty is that not respecting intellectual property rights
may also violate other international obligations, such as those
contained in bilateral investment treaties, though of course this is
not a problem in Brazil, which has not concluded any such treaties.
But there is also the possibility of a violation of WIPO obligations.
There was an interesting debate on this within WIPO a couple of
years ago. A WIPO official expressed the view that a suspension
of TRIPS obligations as a result of WTO cross-retaliation could
violate WIPO obligations with respect to copyright. He was
promptly contradicted by the WIPO spokesperson, who said that
he was speaking in his private capacity. A leading US professor of
law, specializing in TRIPS, Professor Fred Abbott, also disagreed
with this statement, saying that WTO Members have agreed by
implication suspended their WIPO obligations. This may be the
case, but it is not certain how an international tribunal would deal
with this, let alone the WTO. And it does not deal with the situation
of later agreements, such as bilateral investment treaties.
 
Compliance and retaliation in practice
Let me now say a few words about compliance and retaliation in
practice. First, there is a very good compliance record of WTO
Members. Out of the roughly 130 cases in which violations have
been found, retaliation has been authorized in only 19 cases. This
means that that compliance with an adverse finding, without the
threat of retaliation, runs at around 85% of cases in which violations
have been found. And when one takes into account settlement at
the door of the courthouse — as in US – Upland Cotton — one can
fairly much fill the remaining 15% gap with complainants who
receive satisfactory compensation. By any standards, in practice
the WTO dispute settlement system is a remarkable success.
Second, when there has not been compliance, there has only rarely
been retaliation: notable examples include cases between the US
and the EU. But of the various developing countries which have
obtained authorization to cross-retaliate against developed
countries by suspending obligations on services and intellectual
property — Ecuador, following the bananas dispute with the EU,
Antigua, following the Gambling dispute with the US, and now
Brazil, following the Cotton dispute with the US — none has actually
gone so far as to implement this authorized retaliation. Other
solutions have been found.
 
The WTO dispute settlement, developing countries and the
role of private lawyers
Let me now say a few words about the WTO dispute settlement
system and developing countries. In terms of overall use of the
system, the statistics are impressive. WTO Secretariat data for the
first ten years of dispute settlement activity shows that 127 of the
335 consultations requests made during that period were from
developing countries, 40 of the 96 panel proceedings completed
involved developing-country complainants, and 33 of the 56
appearances before the Appellate Body in 2007 were from
developing countries. But this activity is highly concentrated among
a few developing countries, including Brazil: in order, in the first 10
years of the DSU, the top five of the system, by complaints
brought, were the US (81), the EU (70), Canada (26), Brazil (22)
and India (16). Soon one will be able to add China.
So the record for developing countries is somewhat mixed, and
indicates clearly that in this, as in other areas, developing countries
are certainly not all in the same situation. There is however one way
in which developing countries have benefitted from a common
approach. Until recently, trade law was not well understood in most
of the world. It was barely taught in any universities anywhere,
including in my native Australia. Where it was better understood
was in government ministries, but here there was also a large
difference between different countries.
It was therefore of some significance when, in 1997, only two years
after the establishment of the WTO, the Appellate Body decided in
the EC – Bananas case to permit private lawyers to represent
countries in dispute settlement proceedings. The United States had
argued against this, and when one considers that the country that
wanted to use private lawyers in the case was St Lucia, one can
see why — as a question of litigation tactics, if not perhaps as a
question of systematic importance. Fortunately for St Lucia, the
Appellate Body decided otherwise, although with the caveat that
private lawyers representing WTO Members are formally speaking
part of their delegations. Since then, law firms — primarily United
States firms with branches in Geneva — have acted for developing
countries, including some of the very large countries. This also
happens from time to time for developed countries, but less
commonly, and for the large players — the US and the EU — it
never happens. These players always rely on their own lawyers.
And, it is fair to say, a number of the larger developing countries are
beginning to do this as well, although gradually, and sometimes on
a case-by-case basis. It also sometimes happens that developing
countries represent themselves when they appear as third parties in
a dispute (where they are not bound by the ruling) but hire outside
counsel when they are actual parties to the dispute.
There are various arguments in favour and against the use of
private lawyers. One obvious downside is that private lawyersare
expensive. One study on this issue calculated that, in private
lawyers fees, even the simplest case costs at least $500,000 and
there are reports of cases costing up to $10m. Indeed, costs have
increased in recent years. Partly this has been because countries
have begun to take the system more seriously, recognizing its
binding nature, partly because the stages and duration of litigation
have multiplied. Let me use US – Upland Cotton as an example.
Brazil requested a panel on 6 February 2003; the report of which
was circulated on 8 September 2004 — so from request to
circulation of final report was 17 months. Then there was an appeal,
and the Appellate Body report was adopted on 21 March 2005:
now a shade over 2 years. The compliance period for all subsidies
was six months later, on 21 September 2005. But this was not the
end of the story. For its part, claiming compliance, the US stopped
any payments under the old program, and introduced new
legislation in January 2006. But Brazil considered this insufficient,
and commenced implementation proceedings under Article 21.5 of
the DSU. There was a new panel request on 18 August 2006,
leading to the adoption of a final Appellate Body report on 20 June
2008. And even this was not the end of the story: on 25 August
2008 there commenced an arbitration as to the amount of
retaliation, and the possibility of cross-retaliating, and this decision
(which I have mainly be quoting from) was circulated on 31 August
2009. An agreement on compensation between the US and Brazil
was then took place in April 2010, and this was notified to the WTO
in August 2010. And the latest stage, as I mentioned, is the
redesignation of Santa Catarina as a pest-free zone on Monday. All
in all, from February 2003 to an agreed solution in April 2010 is 7
years. So, to refer back to my original point, this is why the costs of
litigation can be immense. They are also, relevantly, not
recoverable.
There are also some other reasons why cases are expensive. One
is that they are beginning to involve increasingly technical matters. It
is not just arguing over the appropriate level of customs duties, or
an internal discriminatory tax: cases now often involve complicated
questions involving scientific exports, under the SPS Agreement on
food safety, as well as economic experts in complicated subsidies
cases.
So these costs are, in principle, a significant deterrent for many
countries to bringing a case. But much has been done to address it
by the establishment in 2001 of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law
(ACWL), which an independent inter-governmental organization with
the mandate to provide developing countries with support in WTO
dispute settlement proceedings, as well as legal advice and training
on WTO law. The ACWL provides its legal services to developing
countries for free or at heavily subsidized rates. These services are
financed largely by an endowment fund of developed country and
developing country contributions: there is an entry fee, which gets
you free legal advice, and there is a subsidized rate for dispute
settlement proceedings. The ACWL can be seen as an
‘international legal aid’ centre in international law. It also provides
training activities for Geneva-based delegates of developing
countries and LDCs. (It also has a fund of CHF 600,000 for
technical expertise in dispute settlement.) It all sounds rather
useful, but Brazil is not a member. There may be various reasons
for this, and it is not for me to speculate about this, but suffice to
say that for whatever its reasons for not joining, Brazil is not alone.
Only a few of the larger developing countries are members, namely
India, Thailand, Turkey and the Philippines being unusual
examples.
 
Forum shopping (RTAs)
I would like to finish by putting the WTO dispute settlement system
in some type of context. In many cases, the WTO is not the only
relevant forum. Where there is a regional trade agreement, there is
frequently also a dispute settlement mechanism set up under that
agreement. It is not difficult to see that this can raise choice of
forum problems. Sometimes there is an attempt to forestall such
problems: some regional trade agreements have exclusive
jurisdiction clauses (as with the European Court of Justice), some
have ‘fork in the road’ provisions, where the party has to elect one
forum and then this becomes exclusive (as with the Protocol of
Olivos in Mercosur). But even when these clauses exist, this does
not necessarily mean that another tribunal — such as WTO
tribunals — would pay any attention to them.
There has not yet been a case which confronted these questions
head on, although Mexico – Soft Drinks came close, and we are
about to see something further, perhaps in US – Tuna III, both of
these involving NAFTA and the WTO. But Brazil was a defendant in
a case which tangentially raised similar issues. This was the case of
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, an EU challenge to a Brazilian
prohibition on the importation of retreaded — as opposed to new —
tyres. The reason for this was that retreaded tyres wear out more
quickly, and when they end up dumped in landfills, they provide a
breeding ground for mosquitoes, leading to greater risks of dengue
fever and malaria. This was not itself the problem: the problem was
that while Brazil applied the ban to the EU, it did not apply the ban to
Uruguay, and the reason that Brazil did this was because, following
an earlier challenge to the measure by Uruguay under the
Mercosur, Brazil had been ordered by a Mercosur tribunal not to
apply the ban to Uruguay. The WTO panel and the WTO Appellate
Body did not care: Mercosur, and the decision of the Mercosur
tribunal, were no defence.
One might think that the Appellate Body is simply ignoring the
Mercosur tribunal in a heavy-handed manner. But this is actually not
the case. From the WTO perspective, the import ban was justified
as a measure necessary to protect human health under Article
XX(b) GATT. But such measures are only permitted if they do not
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between WTO
Members. The import ban certainly discriminated against the EU in
favour of Uruguay. The question was whether that was arbitrary or
unjustifiable. The panel had said that it was not, because the
Mercosur tribunal decision was rational. The Appellate Body agreed
with this, but also said that rational decisions can still be ‘arbitrary or
unjustifiable’. (I would prefer to say they can be unjustifiable but not
arbitrary, but one gets the same result). The test, for the Appellate
Body, was whether the discrimination could be justified on the
grounds of human health. The answer, of course, was no: the
discrimination had nothing to do with health. In fact, the Appellate
Body pointed out that Brazil — for some unknown reason — had
failed to even try to defend its measure on health grounds in
Mercosur, which it could have done. The strong implication was that
Brazil had not run a very good defence.
There is more to it, of course. Regional trade agreements are
protected in the WTO system by Article XXIV GATT, which applies
(according to the Appellate Body) as a defence for any measure
‘necessary’ to the formation of a regional trade agreement. There is
a lot to be said about this, including whether the test is correct, and
how it would apply to rulings of tribunals set up under regional trade
agreements. Some of this was actually argued in Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres, but in the end the Appellate Body was not asked
to make a decision on this, and so the answer remains uncertain. It
is likely to arise again, perhaps even in the US – Tuna III case
currently pending before a panel, which involves choice of forum
issues under NAFTA. In sum, this is an issue to keep an eye on.
 
Conclusion
This brings me to my conclusion. I hope I have covered the sort of
issues you were hoping to hear from me, and I thank you, and
President Alcantara, very much indeed for listening to me, and I
look forward to any further questions you might have.
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